The Deal in Review

Now that the next round of talks between Iran and the "P5+1" group of countries -- China, France, Germany, Russia, the U.K. and U.S. -- will be convening in Istanbul early next year, it seems like a good time to take another look at the nuclear swap deal brokered between Turkey, Brazil and Iran last May. Although the deal was dismissed by the United States and others at the time as being insufficient, the venue of the upcoming talks does raise the question of where that deal might fit into the new round of discussions and what role the "Turkish approach" (less confrontation, more engagement) to Iran might play in how these new talks unfold.

To get a better sense of what some of the answers to these questions might be, I recently had an email interview with Aaron Stein, a a research fellow at the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation in Istanbul, where he works on Turkey’s security policy and how Turkey perceives the Iranian nuclear program. Here's our exchange:

1. What is your assessment of the swap agreement worked out between Turkey, Brazil and Iran?

In my opinion, the Joint Declaration signed and negotiated by Iran, Turkey and Brazil has little nonproliferation value and does little to slow Iran’s controversial nuclear program. I am convinced that Turkish Prime Minister Reccep Taip Erdogan and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva had the best of intentions when negotiating the Declaration. Despite their best intentions, the document does not address, or limit Iran’s enrichment program. The Declaration fails to take into account Iran’s decision to enrich uranium to 19.75 percent. The Declaration resulted from months of diplomatic negotiations, which were preceded by similar negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran. The length of negotiations prompted prominent Arms Control and Nuclear Weapons Expert Jeffrey Lewis to call the Declaration the, “Zombie fuel swap” because it the initiative never seems to die.

The first iteration of the fuel swap appeared during negotiations in October 2009 between the P5 +1 and Iran. During these negotiations Iran agreed in principle to send 1,200 kg of low enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia and France for fuel rod fabrication. The Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) – a small 5 MWt research reactor supplied by the United States to Iran in 1967 - is expected to run out of 19.7 percent enriched LEU fuel in 2010. Tehran’s dwindling supply of LEU fuel prompted the Iranian government to seek foreign suppliers, and signal its readiness to negotiate a fuel swap arrangement. Faced with the prospect of the TRR’s impending shutdown, Iranian ministers tentatively agreed with representatives of the P5+1 to this fuel swap arrangement at a meeting in October 2009. Despite the apparent diplomatic breakthrough, Iran backed off of its original agreement, proposing to ship out its LEU in 400 kg increments, and demanded that the transfer take place on the Iranian Gulf Island of Kish. The IAEA, the United States, and other members of the P5+1 rejected Iran’s counter proposal, claiming that it violated the spirit of the initial agreement, which called for the shipment of all 1,200 kg in one batch. The Obama administration and other members of the P5+1 were demanding that Iran ship all 1,200 kg LEU to France and Russia because, at the time, this would have left Iran without enough LEU for a nuclear weapon, should Iran choose to further enrich its LEU stockpile to weapons grade highly enriched uranium (HEU). At the time, the IAEA had reported that Iran had stockpiled 1,500 kg of LEU. If Iran were to have shipped all 1,200 kg of LEU, it would have taken Iran many months to replenish its LEU reserves, thus limiting its weapons break out capability.

The diplomatic impasse prompted Mohammed El-Baradei, the former director General Director of the IAEA, to step in and suggest Turkey as an alternative site for the fuel swap. El-Baradei believed that Turkey’s long standing participation in the NATO alliance and its close relations with the Islamic Republic made it an ideal place for the fuel swap to take place. Following the proposal, Ahmet Davutoglu indicated his country’s willingness to hold Iranian LEU. Thus, setting in motion Turkey’s participation in the Iran fuel swap negotiations.

Beginning in November, Ahmet Davutoglu and Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehe Mottaki met a number of times to discuss the fuel swap arrangement. This culminated with the release of the Joint Declaration (for a full text of the Declaration please visit, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2010/may/17/iran-brazil-turkey-nuclear) indicating Iran’s willingness to ship 1,200 kg of LEU to Turkey within a month, if the Vienna Group (The United States, France, Russia and the United Nations) endorsed the declaration and specifically agreed to deliver LEU fuel rods to Iran for use at the TRR.

In its current form, the current Declaration has little non-proliferation value and does not address Iran’s nuclear breakout capability. Experts estimate that a country like Iran would need 1,200 kg of LEU to produce enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon, should Iran decide to enrich its LEU to 90 percent. When the Declaration was concluded, the IAEA had reported that Iran had accumulated 2,300 kg of LEU. The removal of 1,200 kg of LEU would allow Iran to replenish its LEU stockpile quickly, thus negating the non-proliferation benefits of the fuel swap arrangement.

In addition, the Declaration does not address other issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Since the Iranian rejection of the original fuel swap proposal in October 2009, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) decided to further enrich its stockpiled LEU to 19.7 percent for use in the TRR. In May 2010, the IAEA released its comprehensive Safeguard Report, which detailed Iran’s stockpile of 19.75 enriched uranium. As of November 2010, Iran has produced 21 kg of 19.75 percent enriched uranium. Perhaps the most glaring weakness of the Iran-Turkey-Brazil declaration is that Iranian enrichment issue is not addressed. The process to further enrich uranium is very complicated. It requires the disassembly and reassemble of centrifuge cascades, while ensuring that the machines will still function correctly. These recent developments, combined with Iran’s growing knowledge about centrifuge technology, has demonstrated Tehran’s ability to produce weapons grade uranium, should it choose to enrich its LEU.

2. Does the agreement bring anything new to the table?

The first iteration of the agreement had a lot of positive aspects and would have delayed Iran’s ability to further enrich LEU for a nuclear weapon, should it choose to do so. The original intention of the fuel swap was to limit Iran’s break out capability. The P5+1 believed that the removal of 1,200 kg of Iranian LEU would give the P5+1 and Iran time to negotiate a diplomatic settlement. The Obama administration’s original intention was to use this “window” to move negotiations along quickly and eventually conclude some sort of nuclear agreement with Iran.

The Declaration does not ascribe to the spirit of original agreement and most importantly, does not deal with any of the major issues that I outlined above – namely Iran’s decision to enrich uranium to twenty percent.

3. Turkey is arguing that the swap deal is useful as a confidence building measure with Iran, which could lay the groundwork for further deals with the country? Do you see any value in that argument?

Despite the tepid response from the P5+1, AK Party officials maintain that the fuel swap arrangement is an important confidence building measure. They argue that the Agreement is nearly identical to the October P5+1 proposal that Iran rejected in October. Despite Iran’s questionable LEU accounting, Iran’s willingness to ship 1,200 kg of LEU to Turkey, all at once and before receiving the reactor fuel from France and Russia, is a step in the right direction. In my opinion, there is some validity to Turkey’s argument.

For Iran-Turkey relations, the Agreement reaffirms the AK Party’s commitment to pursuing a negotiated settlement to the Iranian nuclear issue, despite heavy U.S. pressure to support the latest UN Sanction’s package. Turkey has proven that it is committed to strengthening its relations with Iran, despite pressure from its traditional allies. By doing so, Ankara may have proven itself to be a valuable intermediary between Iran and the West. It also reaffirms Ankara’s new independent minded foreign policy, and may signal to leaders in Tehran that Turkey acts in good faith when discussing its nuclear program.

In my opinion, any agreement with Iran over its nuclear program is a “diplomatic win” and should be pursued whole-heartedly. In the complex world of international relations, agreements and iterated interaction between two parties increases trust and cooperation. It breaks the cycle of negative reciprocity, and may lead to each side making concessions. In short, any effort to break the persistence and perseverance of “zero-sum” thinking can help move diplomatic processes forward and help contribute to an eventual agreement. Thus, the confidence building argument has some validity and I do not think critics of the Agreement shouldn’t dismiss Turkey’s diplomatic efforts.

However, non-one should believe that this Agreement, even if it were to be implemented, wasn’t politically motivated and served the interests of all of the parties involved, especially Iran.

4. What's your take on the role Turkey has been playing in helping resolve the Iran nuclear issue?

Since the election of the AK Party in 2003, Turkey has set about changing the basic tenets of its foreign policy in the Middle East. AK Party’s foreign policy has been based on what Turkey’s current Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutogolu, calls “strategic depth”- a foreign policy seeking to balance Turkey’s relations with the West and its former Ottoman provinces in the South and East. Davutoglu promotes Turkish “soft power,” believing that friendly relations with all of Turkey’s neighbors will benefit Turkish economic and political interests in the region. The AK Party is opposed to further sanctions against Iran, arguing that they hurt Turkish economic interests, and that they serve as the first step towards the legitimization of war.

The statistics and evidence back Davutoglu’s arguments and Ankara’s Iran policy makes perfect sense. Iran is Turkey’s second largest provider of natural gas and bilateral trade between the countries topped 10 billion dollars in 2008. Thus, from an economic standpoint Turkey’s hesitation to support any new UNSC sanctions is perfectly logical. In addition, Turkey and Iran share a common threat from Kurdish separatist groups operating based in Northern Iraq. Since the formation of the Party for Freedom in Kurdistan (PJAK), a sister terrorist organization of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Turkey and Iran have increased counter-terrorism and military cooperation.

Furthermore, Turkey’s determination to conclude some sort of nuclear agreement with Iran reflects the AK Party’s thinking about foreign policy. Turkey’s negotiations with Iran can simply be seen as a manifestation of what Davutoglu and the AK Party have been saying all along. Namely, that while in power they would pursue an interest led foreign policy, promoting regional peace, while balancing Turkey’s relations with the East and West. Turkey’s recent actions smack of Realpolitique, a term and concept that should not be foreign to leaders in Washington, Paris and London.

5. There seems to be less concern in Turkey about a nuclear Iran than in Europe and the US. Why do you think that is?

Since the election of AK Party, one cannot go one week without reading a headline in some major American/European newspaper that asks “Is Turkey Turning East?” Reporters, security analysts, and foreign policy bloggers often point to Turkey’s religious government and its balanced foreign policy as proof of Ankara’s creeping “Islamization.” Frequently, these article are precipitated by a comment or speech made by Prime Minister Erdogan, where he says something about his country’s Iran policy. These fears are exacerbated by Turkey’s position on the Iranian nuclear issue and by its recent decision to vote “no” on the latest UNSC sanctions.

I believe that the difference between the West and Turkey’s position on the dangers posed by Iran’s nuclear program is driven by each country’s immediate and long-term security threats. The West views Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon as a threat because they believe that an Iranian nuclear weapon will upset regional stability and prompt the Sunni Arab states to build their own nuclear weapons. Needless to say, a nuclear arms race in the world’s oil producing nations would harm American and European security and economic interests.

Secondly, I don’t think that one can ignore the West’s discomfort with Islam and its immediate association with terrorism. Thus, there is a persuasive and pervasive discourse in American and European communities that believe Iran’s religious beliefs will exempt them from believing in the traditional concepts of deterrence.

Turkey and Iran, on the other hand, have a shared sense of national identity that stems from a common history of powerful empires that were usurped by imperialism. Both countries are home to historic Middle Eastern Empires that controlled large swaths of territory in the Middle East and Central Asia. The two former empires share a number of cultural and religious similarities and they have shared a common and un-changing border since the signing the Kasr-i Şırın Treaty in 1639. I believe that the long history of cordial relations has lessened Turkish threat perceptions.

Despite the similarities, there are differing perceptions within Turkey about the dangers posed by a nuclear Iran. In my opinion, Turkish thinking about the potential dangers posed by Iran’s nuclear program appear to correlate with an individuals interpretation of Turkey’s secularist principles – those that argue that Iran’s nuclear program is a major threat to tend to favor a rigid and strict interpretation of secularism, while those that favor a more loose interpretation of Ataturk’s secularist principles are generally less threatened by Iran’s nuclear program.

Thus, like all of Turkish politics there is an internal struggle over the direction of the country’s foreign policy. I think these divergent opinions can be traced back to the words of Ataturk who said “Peace at home, peace in the region.” Thus far, the AK party has flipped the meaning of these words and has come to believe that “peace in the region leads to peace at home.” The AK Party’s primary fear is an American or Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear sites. The resulting chaos, they believe, will upset Turkey’s economic growth and could contribute to terrorist activity in the Southeast. The specter of a nuclear Iran takes a back seat to Turkey’s immediate security interests, meaning that in the short term the prospect of an American/Israeli attack is more of a threat to Turkey’s security than a nuclear armed Iran. In the West, the opposite is true; officials argue that a nuclear-armed Iran will be the catalyst for regional upheaval and instability.

Thus, it seems that the two sides will continue to not see eye-to-eye on this important issue.

Nuclear Test

Alexander Jackson, senior editor at CRIA, an online journal covering the Caucasus and the surrounding region, has an interesting analysis piece looking at how the Iran nuclear issue might test Turkey's "zero problems with neighbors" foreign policy. From his piece (which includes some of my analysis):

Maintaining good commercial links with its neighbours is one of the central pillars of Turkey’s “zero problems with neighbours” approach. Widely lauded when it was developed by [Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet] Davutoglu in the early 2000s, this policy is now coming under serious strain. Turkey is attempting to utilise its regional links, and [Prime Minister Recep Tayyip] Erdogan seems to think that by publicly supporting Iran, he can benefit the West by maintaining a channel of communication which no other country has.

As [Yigal] Schleifer points out, “this is a risky approach”. Playing a double game cannot be sustained forever, and neither Iran nor the West will be pleased if Turkey appears to be misleading them. At some point Ankara will have to choose between harming its commercial interests in Iran and damaging its relationship with Brussels and Washington (not to mention Israel).

This point looks to be arriving soon, as the Security Council moves towards a vote on a new round of economic sanctions. Voting “no” would cause disappointment if not anger in the Obama Administration, and could also – as Lesser observes – be a further blow to Turkey’s EU membership ambitions. Voting “yes” would cause a rupture with Tehran, with all the related political and economic implications. Abstention, the most likely course, would be a diplomatic fudge.

It would raise the question of whether the ‘zero problems’ approach can survive in moments of crisis, when hard choices have to be made. It also tests the limitations of that policy. Does Ankara even have the leverage to persuade Iran to accept a deal?

Foreign Minister Davutoglu seems assured – in recent weeks he has confidently stated that concrete progress has been made on the topic, presumably regarding a proposal to enrich uranium outside of Iran (Today’s Zaman, April 21). However to date he has offered no concrete indicators of success.

In addition, Tehran has responded politely to Turkey’s offers of mediation, but it may simply be stalling for time. No other friendly states – including Russia and China – have been able to negotiate a deal. Ankara’s enthusiasm and confidence may be seriously misplaced, especially if Mr Gul’s comments are seen in Iran as proof that Turkey’s public and private positions are different.

The issue goes to the heart of Turkey’s foreign policy vision. If Ankara cannot persuade its neighbour, with whom it has “very special” relations, to change its behaviour, then its claims to regional influence will look decidedly weaker to the West, as well as neighbouring states. Its economic, political, and cultural links with Iran will come to be seen not as assets, but as liabilities. By proclaiming its support of Iran so loudly, and by insisting on its unique ability to mediate in the dispute, Turkey may be setting itself up for a fall.

You can read the full analysis here.

Neo-Ottomanism and Iran's Nuclear Program

Andrew Finkel has a good column in Sunday's Today's Zaman, looking at the much debated term "Neo Ottomanism," often used to describe Turkey's assertive new foreign policy, and how it relates to some of the thornier issues facing Ankara -- particularly relations with Armenia and Iran's nuclear program. From Finkel's piece:

....The notion of a more expansive, internationalist and problem-solving Turkey is an attractive one, as is that of a Turkey unfettered by nationalist-inspired tendency to isolationism. However, it is forced to confront a certain amount of skepticism. If Turkey is to adopt a neo-Ottoman posture, it has to contend with issues still unresolved from that imperial past. If it is to be a player in the great issues of the day, it cannot remain fettered by the great issues of a century ago. This is why the overture to Armenia that began with Abdullah Gül’s football diplomacy in 2008 had an importance even beyond the immediate issue of reducing tension on a troubled border.

The seeming collapse of that initiative has equally important consequences. The vote of a committee of the US House of Representatives to endorse a resolution recognizing genocide has sent Ankara into a tailspin or at least into a position which it struggles to sustain. Turkey withdrew its ambassador to demonstrate its displeasure, and the government has put pressure on civil institutions, such as the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSIAD), to cancel a US-bound delegation. Now the Turkish ambassador will go scurrying back to Massachusetts Avenue because, rightly enough, the prime minister realizes that not to take his seat at the Global Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in a week’s time would be a display of diplomatic pique that would do Turkey harm.

That summit will be attended by some 40 leaders, including Chinese President Hu Jintao. Barack Obama is far more aggressive in trying to curtail nuclear proliferation and in reducing America’s own stockpile. During the summit, the subject of Iran’s race to develop a nuclear capability is bound to come up. Turkey, counter-intuitively, maintains that Tehran’s nuclear program is not intended to produce an offensive payload and is in no mood to impose sanctions come what may. Instead, it advertises its ability to play the role of an honest broker as the best means of coaxing Iran into abandoning its efforts to develop a bomb. Yet it does so, having painted itself into something of an absurd corner. Ankara now fumbles to impose some sort of sanction not against Iran but against the United States. And it does so because of the wording of a proposed text commemorating a tragedy that occurred 95 years ago.

You can read the full column here. More on neo-Ottomanism in these previous posts.

Speaking of Iran's nuclear program, it appears that there is a (unspoken) disagreement between Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan about what Teheran is actually up to. Erdogan has consistently defended Iran's nuclear program and has said he does not believe the Iranians are working towards building nuclear weapons (instead suggesting that other countries in the region (guess who) that already have such weapons and are criticizing Iran get rid of them first).

This more or less has been the position of the AKP government on the Iranian issue. A recent column in Forbes by foreign affairs writer Claudia Rosett finds President Gul speaking a bit more frankly on the issue. From her column:

Gul says he has no doubts that Iran wants the nuclear bomb: "This is an Iranian aspiration dating back to the previous regime, the days of the Shah." For Iran's current regime, says Gul, "I do believe it is their final aspiration to have a nuclear weapon in the end," as a matter of " 'national pride.' "

He says Turkey is against an Iranian bomb. He believes it would trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East: "A major competition will start in the region."

You can read her full column (critical of Turkey's "zero problems with neighbors" approach) here. Rosett visited Turkey as part of a group that was brought over by a Turkish think tank. Gul's office has not denied the substance of what Rosett quotes the President as saying, only saying he did not give an interview to Forbes. In this column, Milliyet's Semih Idiz follows up on Rosett's piece and the significance of what Gul said.

More on Turkey's struggle regarding the Iranian nuclear issue in these previous posts.

Slow Train Coming

It took some 18 hours for it to cover 500 kilometers (310 miles), but the first train in decades to run between Iraq and Turkey ended its maiden voyage today, starting in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul and arriving in southern Turkey's Gaziantep (with a short leg through Syria).

The train, which carried 13 passengers, runs along a line built a century ago by German engineers who helped create a rail link that stretches from Berlin to Baghdad (the Haydarpasa station on Istanbul's Asian side was constructed as part of the same project). From the BBC's report about the renewed rail service:

The revived rail link symbolises the increasingly close ties between the three countries [Turkey, Syria and Iraq].

Having overcome its fear of Kurdish nationalism, Turkey now does about $10bn of trade with Iraq's Kurdish regional government every year - about 80% of goods sold there are Turkish.

Relations between Iraq and Syria are more fragile - in the past Syria has been accused of backing the insurgents behind several big bomb attacks in Iraq.

But trade between them - and between Syria and Turkey - is growing rapidly.
Turkey is gradually upgrading its railway network with high-speed routes and Iraq also plans big investments in its railways.

The Turkish government is now talking of a fast rail link running all the way to Pakistan.

You can read the full story here. An AFP report is here.

The railway desk at Ankara's "zero problems with neighbors" policy department certainly seems to be very active these days. Along with the Mosul line, Turkey is building a fast train link between Gaziantep and Aleppo in Syria and is part of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project, which conceivably could end up being linked up to a rail network that stretches all the way to China.

[UPDATE -- I forgot to originally also mention Turkey's ongoing Marmaray tunnel project, which will create an underwater rail link between the European and Asian sides of Istanbul. Currently, trains heading from Europe to Asia (or the other way around), need to be put onto ferries that take them across the Bosphorus. Once Marmaray is complete, there will be an uninterrupted rail line between the two continents.]

Despite its lack of speed, it would seem that the slow train from Mosul might be a harbinger of important things to come. Turkish foreign policy watchers might now need to add trainspotting to their list of activities.

(graphic from the BBC)

Turkey Doth Protest Too Much?

Today's Zaman has an interview today with Richard Giragosian, director of the Yerevan-based Armenian Center for National and International Studies, about the new tension between Turkey and Armenia over their recently signed normalization accords. Giragosian has some fairly tart things to say about Ankara's criticism of the language used in the Armenian Constitutional Court's recent decision to accept the accords.

From the interview:

"I find the Turkish reaction not only disingenuous but unfair, as there was never any doubt over the Armenian side’s commitment to ensure a speedy and full passage of the protocols,” he said and added that Turkey might be looking to create a new political “pretext” to withdraw from the protocols....

....Asked what will come next, Giragosian said the situation is not very promising.

“Turkey has so far only sought to enlarge this into an issue much more divisive than it should be,” he said. “Hopefully, both sides can recover and find a new way beyond this rather exaggerated crisis, but it now remains a test of Turkish political will much more than a challenge for the Armenian side.”

You can read the full article here.

Worth noting that one of the reasons Giragosian gives for why he thinks Turkey is overplaying things is that, considering the lack of independence found in Armenia's judicial system and the government's wish to have the accords approved, the Constitutional Court's (preordained) decision doesn't really amount to much. Not a great statement about the state of democratic affairs in Armenia.

Accords in Discord

It appears that both sides in the shotgun wedding that is the stalled Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process might be looking for a way out. Ankara has warned Yerevan, in fairly strong terms, that the conditions that the Armenian Constitutional Court has put on the historic accords are unacceptable and could jeopardize the process. Yerevan, meanwhile, is reminding Ankara that it is the one that put preconditions on the process, by linking it to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, and by letting the accords languish in parliament.

Milliyet's Semih Idiz has a good column in today's Hurriyet Daily News looking at how each side in the matter is giving the other one the excuse it needs to get out of the forced arrangement. From his column:

It is clear, however, that these protocols are not moving. There is a tangible reluctance and reserve on both sides in this respect. The Recep Tayyip Erdoğan government is not blameless either having effectively slapped a “Karabakh condition” on the ratification of the protocols by the Turkish Parliament.

Erdoğan boasts that “his government is one step ahead of the Armenian government,” having sent the protocols to Parliament for ratification. He argues that the rest is up to Parliament now.

In the meantime he keeps insisting that it is unlikely that Parliament will ratify the protocols, unless there is movement on the Karabakh front to Azerbaijan’s advantage.

This is completely disingenuous.

Erdoğan is playing to the political gallery because he knows there is serious opposition in Turkey to the protocols. If he wanted to show real leadership, however, he could guide his party, which has a majority in Parliament, to vote for the protocols without delay.

Some argue, of course, that many of Erdoğan’s own deputies would vote against the protocols given the sensitivity of all issues related to Armenia and Armenians. If so, that begs an even bigger question. Why did the Erdoğan government initiate this process in the first place then if it was not going to be able to complete it?

In the meantime, the confusing ruling of the Constitutional Court has given a fresh argument for those in Ankara who are reluctant about the Turkish-Armenian process.

Neither does there seem to be extreme enthusiasm in Yerevan over the issue.

The government there has said it will only endorse the protocols if the Turkish Parliament does and hence the current stalemate. It also appears to be doing little to support the protocols in public against harsh opposition and criticism.

Put openly, there is no will in Ankara or Yerevan at the present time to find a way to move forward in their ties. If there was, that way forward would be found regardless of the difficulties.

You can read the whole piece here. For some background on the accords and the hurdles facing them, take a look this previous post.

(Photo: the Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers shaking hands after signing their October accords agreement in Zurich.)

The Closing of the "Armenian Opening"?

While I'm at it, might as well look at another significant Turkish policy move that now seems to be in trouble: the rapprochement with Armenia.

Although Turkey and Armenia signed an agreement in October that paves the way for the two countries to restore relations and open up their borders, the document still needs to be ratified by both countries' parliaments. There has been little action on that front in either Ankara or Yerevan. Turkey has clearly been reluctant to move ahead with its "Armenian opening" without any movement on the stalled Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Armenia insists the two issues should not be linked.

Now it seems Yerevan is losing patience. From an AFP report:

"Armenia is prepared to honor its international commitments and we expect the same from Turkey," President Serge Sarkisian said during a press conference with his Latvian counterpart, Valdis Zatlers.

"If Turkey drags out the ratification process, Armenia will immediately make use of possibilities stemming from international law. I have instructed relevant state bodies to prepare amendments to our laws pertaining to the signing, ratification and abrogation of international agreements," Sarkisian said.

For more information on the hurdles facing Turkey and Armenia's rapprochement, take a look at this previous post.

Ankara's Road to Damascus

I have a new piece up on the Christian Science Monitor about how Turkey's foreign policy ambitions are forcing it to confront some of the "domestic" problems that for decades have been no go areas for the country. Without solving these issues (Kurdish, Armenian and Cyprus problems, in particular), Ankara's ability to achieve many of its foreign policy goals in the region could be severely limited.

From the article:

Stymied by European resistance to its bid for EU membership, Turkey's government has forcefully realigned the country's foreign policy over the past few years. Led by the liberal Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP), it has sought to engage more with the surrounding region and to establish itself as a neighborhood soft-power broker.

But observers say that Ankara's foreign policy ambitions are tied up in first resolving what were, until recently, taboo issues – particularly the Armenian, Kurdish, and Cypriot problems – that have cast a heavy shadow over Turkey's domestic politics for the past few decades.

"Turkey wants to play internationally, and to play internationally it has to put [its] house in order," says Henri Barkey, an expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.

"With their strong military and economy, they have the hard power, but what they are trying to do now is build up their soft power. Turkey is lecturing other countries, like Israel and the Chinese, about human rights issues, and here you have a country where the Kurdish language is illegal. That is absurd," he says.

Ankara has been making moves on these issues. On Oct. 10, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu signed a deal in Switzerland that paves the way for restoring diplomatic ties with Armenia and for the two countries to review their mutually contested history. Four days later, Turkey hosted Armenian President Serge Sarkizian for another round of "football diplomacy" – a World Cup qualifying match between the Turkish and Armenian national teams.

The same day, Mr. Davutoglu was in Syria, signing yet another important deal, this one abolishing visa requirements between two powers that only a decade ago were on the verge of war after Ankara accused Damascus of supporting the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

Turkish leaders have also made clear their intent to soon introduce a broad democratization initiative to deal with the Kurdish issue. And Turkey has given its support to reunification talks between the Greek and Turkish governments of divided Cyprus.

The Turkish government's moves are being enabled, on the one hand, by a gradual change in society and political life that has made it easier to talk about these issues.

"Until very recently, the public had been conditioned to accept things from the perspective of statism, nationalism, and chauvinism," says Dogu Ergil, a professor at Ankara University. "But the dominance of the state over issues and making them taboo and undebatable is fading."

Ankara also appears to be driven by a realization that these taboos were hurting Turkey's ability to make an impact abroad. "That position was limiting.... Until recently, Turkish foreign policy was mostly reactive, it didn't take any initiatives, and it didn't do things beyond its own borders," says Mr. Barkey.

You can read the whole piece here.

Turkey and Armenia: The Rocky Road Ahead

I have a briefing up on the World Politics Review website looking at the protocols recently signed by Turkey and Armenia to restore diplomatic relations and some of the hurdles these protocols might face in being implemented. From the briefing:

Yesterday's signing of protocols by Turkey and Armenia that pave the way for restoring relations between the two countries was, without a doubt, a historic moment. But it's still too early to break out the champagne.

The protocols -- signed in Zurich in the presence of the American, French and Russian foreign ministers -- spell out in the clearest terms to date what needs to happen in order for diplomatic ties to be restored and for the two countries' borders to be reopened. But significant hurdles, some of which involve actors outside of Turkey and Armenia themselves, still stand in the way of that actually happening.

Ankara and Yerevan broke off relations in 1993, when Turkey closed its border with Armenia. The move followed Armenia's invasion of the Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, but the animosity between the two countries goes backs decades further, to what Armenia alleges was the genocide of an estimated 1.5 million Armenians under the Ottoman Turks during World War I.

Turkey admits that Armenians were killed, but claims in significantly lower numbers, and fiercely rejects suggestions that the killings were genocide. Ankara argues instead that the deaths were a result of a civil uprising, when Armenians joined forces with invading Russians.

The protocols -- signed with the help of Swiss mediation and American and European arm twisting -- call for the renewal of diplomatic ties, opening of the common border and the establishment of a host of intergovernmental sub-commissions. The most significant of the latter will include experts who will take a look at the "historical dimension" of the Turkish-Armenian relationship.

The only catch -- and a potentially deal-breaking one -- is that the protocols will only go into effect once the parliaments in both countries ratify them. And in both Turkey and Armenia, domestic opposition could stand in the way of that happening....

....Still, restoring ties promises to pay significant dividends for both Turkey and Armenia.

For Turkey, restoring relations with Armenia is critical, both for its European Union candidacy and for its regional ambitions. Ankara hopes to play a larger political and diplomatic role in the surrounding region, and to establish itself as an important energy transit route. The closed border with Armenia remains one of the glaring exceptions to Turkey's new foreign policy, which it describes as "zero problems with neighbors." It also leaves Turkey -- and the West -- dependent on volatile Georgia as the main transit route for Caspian oil and gas.

For Armenia, restoring relations with Turkey would end its isolation in the region and could provide the cash-strapped country with new economic opportunities.

The question for both countries, as well as for some of their neighbors in the region, is whether they can find a way to create a new reality in the Caucasus, or if instead they will remain hostages to history and enmity.

(You can read the full briefing here.)

For Turkey and Armenia, a Roadmap's Final Destination Still Unclear

Last week's announcement by Turkey and Armenia that they have agreed on a set of protocols that will lead towards the normalization of their relations and the opening of their borders was certainly welcome news. A previous breakthrough in Turkish-Armenian reconciliation -- last April's vague declaration that the two countries had agreed on a "roadmap" for restoring relations -- quickly fizzled out when Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that there would be no progress on the Armenian front until the "full liberation" of the Azeri territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, occupied by Armenian forces since 1993.

What's different this time around is the release of the detailed protocols, which offer a clear path towards the reopening of the Turkish-Armenian border and renewal of diplomatic ties between Ankara and Yerevan. But has Turkey really changed its position on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue? Will the Turkish parliament, which must ratify the protocols for them to take effect (as does Armenia's), support the move without any concrete action on the Nagorno-Karabakh front? From an analysis piece I have up on the Eurasianet website:

The Nagorno-Karabakh peace process is a complicating factor for the ratification of the protocols. Turkey is Azerbaijan’s strongest ally, and Ankara imposed its economic blockade on Armenia in 1993 to support Baku’s efforts to retain control over Karabakh. Currently, Armenian forces control Karabakh, along with large areas of Azerbaijan proper that surround the enclave.

The timing of the withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied Azerbaijani lands is one of the primary sticking points in the Karabakh peace process.

The announcement last April of the existence of a "roadmap" to renew ties between Turkey and Armenia led to a strong backlash from Baku, and to what seemed like a stepping back from the deal on Ankara’s part.

During a May 14 address to the Azerbaijani parliament, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared "that the border between Turkey and Armenia will be open only after the full liberation of Azerbaijani occupied territories."

Although the recently released protocols make no mention of a linkage between the normalization of Turkish-Armenian ties and the Karabakh peace process, "there’s no doubt that the Karabakh issue looms over this reconciliation process," says Kiniklioglu.

"If there is no movement on Nagorno-Karabakh, it will be up to the Turkish parliament to assess the situation and judge accordingly."

Observers believe the Turkish government is now counting on international pressure to increase on Armenia and Azerbaijan to reach some kind of agreement regarding the disputed territory. Although the AKP has a majority in parliament, many observers believe that it will be difficult to ratify the protocols without any movement on the Nagorno-Karabakh front.

"Erdogan obviously feels that Turkey wants to see something on Nagorno-Karabakh before they can take it to parliament. The problem is [that the protocols are] in Turkey’s interest, even if nothing happens on Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey’s overwhelming national interest is in putting this Armenian problem behind it," says Hugh Pope, a Turkey analyst with the Brussels-based International Crisis Group.

Over at Today's Zaman, the Brookings Institute's Omer Taspinar also takes a look at last week's announcement, saying it might be a bit to early to break out a bottle of "nice Caucasian champagne to celebrate." The protocols being ratified by both the Turkish and Armenian parliaments is a big "if," Taspinar says. Reminding readers that this breakthrough in Turkish-Armenian relations started with Turkish president Abdullah Gul going to Armenia for a World Cup qualifying game between the two countries' national teams, Taspinar writes:

The good news is that the so-called “soccer-diplomacy” is alive and well. The not so good news is that we are still at halftime, and the fanatic supporters of the two national teams can cancel the game or disqualify their teams by throwing sharp knifes on the field....

....So, last week's announcement comes just in time to maintain the façade of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. If no sharp knives are thrown onto the field, soccer diplomacy will inch forward. It may still be too early to speak of a genuine rapprochement between Ankara and Yerevan. Yet, no one accuses the two parties of not trying. Negotiations between stubborn neighbors are never easy. But as Winston Churchill wisely said, “To jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war.”

So where is this Turkish-Armenian "roadmap" actually going to lead to? The next few weeks will give a clearer indication of that. One thing is clear: the protocols agreed upon by Ankara and Yerevan might not refer to Nagorno-Karabakh, but the "roadmap" for Turkish-Armenian reconciliation leads straight through the heart of that disputed territory.

Dueling Pipelines and Turkey’s Delicate Energy Dance

A few weeks ago, Ankara was the scene of the celebratory signing of an intergovernmental agreement for the troubled Nabucco pipeline project, designed to weaken Russia’s grip on Europe’s energy supply by bringing Caspian and Middle Eastern gas to the continent via Turkey and the Balkans. (For more background on Nabucco, take a look at this series of posts from Istanbul Calling.) Although the pipeline is still far from becoming a reality, the signing in Ankara was hailed as an important step in helping Europe diversify its energy supply.

Cut to last week, when Ankara was the scene of the signing of another series of energy-related agreements, only this time with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Among the agreements signed was one that would allow Russia’s proposed South Stream gas pipeline – seen as a potentially lethal rival to the Nabucco project – to run through Turkish waters on the Black Sea.

What’s going on here? Had Ankara just stabbed Nabucco (and the European Union, it’s main supporter) in the back? Turkish officials clearly don’t want things to look that way, with “diplomatic sources” telling the English-language Hurriyet Daily News that “Nabucco is still [Turkey’s] priority.” That might be the case, but Ankara certainly also knows that as it moves along on Nabucco, it also needs to keep Moscow’s interests in mind. If anything, the recent dueling signings in Ankara serve as a good example of the delicate dance that Turkey now has to perform as part of its new, multi-polar foreign policy, which seeks to minimize conflict with its neighbors while also raising the country’s regional and international profile. As political scientist Bulent Aras points out in a new report he wrote on Turkish-Russian relations for the Foundation for Political Economic and Social Research (SETA), an Ankara-based think tank: “Under the strong influence of its new geographic thinking toward Russia, Ankara tries to avoid taking sides in any ‘Russia versus the West’ struggles, while developing its own relations with Moscow.”

From being intense regional rivals and then Cold War foes, Turkey and Russia have moved towards being strong partners in trade, defense and energy. That said, Turkey – like Europe – also finds itself heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies, importing 63 percent of its gas and 28 percent of its oil from Russia. It is now also working out terms with a Russian company to build Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, something that critics say will only deepen the country’s dependence on Russia. Still, Ankara policymakers realize that working together with Russia makes more sense for Turkey than antagonizing it.

But as Aras points out in his SETA report, this new approach to Russia will not be without its limitations:

“There is no guarantee that the Turkish politicians’ projection of good relations with Russia will be possible without endangering its relations with the EU and the US….

…. The current developments indicate that Turkish and Russian policy-makers have the political will to improve bilateral relations in the realm of politics, economy and security. However, these relations are not free of a number of serious problems that could threaten a derailing in the growing ties; both countries have converging and conflicting interests in neighboring regions. This fact, in combination with the high-profile status of both countries, makes Turkish-Russian relations promising, yet difficult.”

Nabucco's New Start

I have a piece up on the Eurasianet website looking at the implications of the Nabucco pipeline agreement signed yesterday in Ankara. From the article:

The troubled Nabucco pipeline project -- designed to diversify Europe’s energy supply and loosen Russia’s grip on the continent’s natural gas market -- took a major step forward on July 13 with the signing of a transit agreement between Turkey and five European Union countries involved in the undertaking.

The 2,050-mile-long (3,300 kilometer) Nabucco pipeline is designed to bring gas from the Caspian Basin and the Middle East to European markets via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. The $10-billion pipeline is scheduled to start operating in 2014. Nabucco’s primary objective is to lessen Europe’s overdependence on Russia for gas. Moscow currently supplies approximately 40 percent of Europe’s gas.

Although the signing is being hailed as an important statement of intent, experts caution that Nabucco still faces major hurdles, particularly regarding where the pipeline’s projected annual need of 31 billion cubic meters of gas will come from. "Now that the agreement is being signed, frankly an even more difficult process begins, as to what will fill the pipeline," says Bulent Aliriza, director of the Turkey Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "Signing the agreement was the easy part."

Despite the signing, there are still no concrete agreements covering Nabucco’s supply. Azerbaijan is currently the most likely supplier, but it can’t fill Nabucco on its own. Other possible sources include Egypt, Syria and Iraq, whose Prime Minister, Nuri Al-Maliki, attended the signing ceremony in Ankara. Turkmenistan also has indicated that it wants to be a supplier.
Another possible, though contentious, supplier would be Iran, which has some of the world’s largest gas reserves. But European Union officials said that, for now, they are ruling out Teheran’s participation. "Iran has major gas reserves and will surely export them one day, but today it imports gas. On top of that, there are the political and legal issues," Andris Piebalgs, the European commissioner on energy issues, said in an interview with the Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review, a Turkish English-language daily. "Until the outstanding questions are solved, Iran will remain a difficult option."

A similar message was given by Richard Morningstar, the United States special energy envoy, who also attended the signing ceremony. "With respect to Iran, our position is very clear. We do not think that Iran should participate at this point," Morningstar told reporters.
The question of supply for Nabucco may become a race against time, given that the route faces stiff competition from other projects, particularly South Stream, which would carry Russian gas under the Black Sea to Bulgaria, from where it would continue to other parts of Europe….

…. With the signing of the transit agreement, which brings together Nabucco’s major stakeholders, it appears that the project’s planners are following the blueprint laid down by the successful Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which transports oil from Azerbaijan to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast via Georgia. Like Nabucco, BTC -- which started pumping oil in 2006 -- is designed to diversify the West’s energy supplies and provide a supply route that avoids Russia. Also like Nabucco, the BTC project faced massive obstacles and no shortage of skeptics who said it would never be built.

"If you look back to the BTC struggle, it’s clear that [the planners] are, to a certain extent, following the same path," says CSIS’s Aliriza. "Signing an inter-governmental agreement like this opens up the way to eventually finishing the project."

But Aliriza also warns that there is a difference this time around. When BTC was being planned, Russia was not the energy power that it is today. Russia’s political and commercial ties with some of the countries involved in Nabucco, particularly with Turkey, have also deepened in recent years. "Given all the leverage that Russia can bring to bear makes certain that the BTC analogy doesn’t really apply," he said.

You can read the full article here.

A Boost for Nabucco?

The troubled Nabucco gas pipeline project, the subject of several previous posts, is about to get what could be an important boost. On Monday, Turkey will host a signing ceremony for a series of agreements that are supposed to give more definition to what so-far has been a rather hazy proposition. The agreements will be signed by the five transit countries that the Nabucco pipeline will go through: Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria.

Although the signing ceremony is a giant step for Nabucco, critics point out that still left unresolved is the problematic question of Turkey's demand that 15 percent of the gas that will go through the pipeline be given to it for its domestic use or for re-export. The European Union has said the Turkish demand is unacceptable. Monday's ceremony, though, may be a sign that both sides foresee a resolution to that issue.

I'll have more about this next week. For now, take a look at this useful Q&A Reuters has put together about Monday's signing ceremony and what it means.

Energy Security vs. Strategic Insecurity

A followup to the other day's post about the Nabucco pipeline project. At the heart of the project lies the increasingly important policy question of “energy security” – how countries can secure diverse sources, particularly of oil and natural gas, and diverse supply routes. One of my concerns is how to keep the search for energy security from becoming an adversarial and short-sighted one that will only lead towards greater insecurity.

As the Associated Press reports, a new Kremlin "National Security Strategy" paper puts battles over energy resources as one of the major challenges facing Russia. From the report:

A Kremlin policy paper says international relations will be shaped by battles over energy resources, which may trigger military conflicts on Russia's borders....

"....The international policy in the long run will be focused on getting hold of energy sources, including in the Middle East, the Barents Sea shelf and other Arctic regions, the Caspian and Central Asia," said the strategy paper that was posted on the presidential Security Council's Web site.

"Amid competitive struggle for resources, attempts to use military force to solve emerging problems can't be excluded," it added. "The existing balance of forces near the borders of the Russian Federation and its allies can be violated."

The Kremlin's thinking certainly seems in line with what's being considered in the United States and Europe. I recently came across a 2008 article entitled “The Militarization of Energy Security,” which appeared in an online journal published by the  Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and was written James A. Russell and Daniel Moran, lecturers at the school. “It is in the energy sector that strategic planners now find it easiest to imagine major states reconsidering their reluctance to use force against each other," the authors wrote.

"‘Energy security’ is now deemed so central to ‘national security’ that threats to the former are liable to be reflexively interpreted as threats to the latter. In a world in which territorial disputes, ideological competition, ethnic irredentism, and even nuclear proliferation all seem capable of being normalized in ways that constrain the actual use of military force, a crisis in global energy supply stands out as the last all-weather casus belli when the moment comes to hypothesize worst-case scenarios.”

New Life for Nabucco?

The Guardian is reporting on what may be a major breakthrough for the troubled Nabucco pipeline project (which was previously discussed in this post). Designed to break Russia's almost monopolistic control over Europe's energy supply, the pipeline would bring natural gas from the Caspian region and the Middle East to European markets via Turkey. Up until now, Nabucco has been dogged by questions over who will be part of providing its supply and by Turkish haggling over transit fees. 

Following a recent summit in Prague that brought together the project's key players, it appears that Nabucco is being given a new lease on life. From the Guardian's report:

The European Union and Turkey have struck a ground-breaking gas pipeline deal unlocking a potential energy bonanza in the Caspian basin after more than a year of deadlock, according to senior EU officials.

The agreement, to be signed in Ankara on 25 June, represents a major boost to the EU's ill-starred Nabucco pipeline project, which is intended to transport natural gas to Europe from central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East, and is the key to breaking the Kremlin's stranglehold over Europe's gas imports. "This is a complete breakthrough," said a senior EU official involved in the tough negotiations with Turkey. "The Turks have accepted our terms. There is no conditionality."

The €9bn Nabucco project is at the centre of a contest pitting Russia against the EU and involving Turkey, Germany, Austria, Azerbaijan and the authoritarian regimes of central Asia in the effort to secure Europe's gas needs while curbing the hold Moscow and the gas monopoly Gazprom have over the supply lines. The case for Nabucco is debated, but was reinforced by Russia's gas war with Ukraine in January, which caused havoc with Gazprom supplies to eastern and central Europe. There had been similar disputes in 2006 and 2007.

Nabucco, stretching more than 2,000 miles from Turkey's eastern border to Europe's main gas hub outside Vienna, would be the main route for pumping gas to Europe not controlled by Gazprom. But the plan had faltered over deadlock between the EU and Turkey over the pipeline transit agreement. More than half the pipeline is to be located in Turkey, making it the gatekeeper of Europe's energy supplies.

Ankara has been driving a hard bargain, insisting on collecting a "tax" on the gas being pumped and demanding 15% of the transit gas at discounted prices. This, say EU officials and the six-company consortium that is to build and run the pipeline, would render Nabucco financially unviable.

The stalemate was broken at a summit in Prague last Friday between the EU and the countries involved. "The 15% demand has gone," Andris Piebalgs, the EU commissioner for energy, told the Guardian. "We've agreed on cost-based transit. We're very close to a conclusion." A senior Czech official organising the summit likened the negotiations to "bargaining in an Istanbul souk", while an EU envoy to the region worried that "nothing is done until it's done".

But the European commission president, José Manuel Barroso, said President Abdullah Gül of Turkey assured him the deal would be signed within weeks. "That's what President Gül told me," he said....

....As well as Nabucco, the Europeans spoke specifically for the first time about supporting the building of a pipeline under the Caspian Sea connecting Turkmenistan and central Asia to Azerbaijan. The central Asian gas was up for grabs, said the senior EU official, and if Europe did not get there first, it would go to Russia or China.

If Nabucco is to happen, it will initially need the gas from Azerbaijan's BP-run Shah Deniz-2 field. But officials in Brussels view Turkmenistan, with its vast gas deposits, as the key to its longer-term viability.

The Russians are pressing the central Asians and Azerbaijan hard to try to put a stop to Nabucco and retain control of all the supply routes to the west. The Turkmens attended the Prague summit, but declined to commit, apparently deciding to try to play the Russians off against the Europeans.

You can read the full article here.

Getting Nabucco off the ground would be a major triumph for the EU and a good sign that the bloc is starting to formulate a more cohesive energy policy. What should be remembered, though, is that once built, the Nabucco pipeline will supply only a fraction of Europe's gas supply. Creating an energy supply that is truly secure -- in terms of diverse sources and supply routes -- will require more long-term thinking and planning.

A Roadmap for Turkey and Armenia, but Hazards Ahead

I have an article up on the Eurasianet website looking at some of the challenges facing Turkey and Armenia in their bid to restore diplomatic relations and reopen their border. From the article:

Turkey and Armenia have announced they are close to reaching an agreement to restore ties and reopen their borders. But observers caution that getting to a final deal will require both Turkey and Armenia to navigate through difficult domestic and external challenges.

"There’s no going back now, that’s for sure. Everybody wants to solve this problem now. Both countries are very committed and being very careful," said Noyan Soyak, the Istanbul-based vice-chairman of the Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council, referring to the April 22 joint announcement that Ankara and Yerevan had agreed on a "road map" to normalize relations.

"Now it’s a question of timing and the implementation and how it’s going to be presented to the public. That’s very important," Soyak added….

….Sorting out the differences between Turkey and Armenia might be the easy part, experts say. It’s the other actors involved in the issue that may prove to be difficult, says Semih Idiz, a foreign affairs columnist with Milliyet, a Turkish daily. "There are more factors that are lining up to spoil this than to bolster this. These factors have to play themselves out in the coming weeks and months and we’ll see where we go," said Idiz.

One significant hurdle to the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement is Azerbaijan, which insists that the Nagorno-Karabakh problem must be resolved before Ankara restores its ties with Yerevan. The Azeris have reacted angrily to the April 22 announcement, signaling that if Turkey proceeds unilaterally, then Baku may respond by strengthening ties with Moscow. The clear implication is that Azerbaijan may be willing to reorient its energy focus, and make Russia, not Turkey its main energy-export option.

"I don’t think Turkey expected the strong Azeri reaction. At the moment there is anger on both sides," Idiz says. "Turkey is not going to lose Azerbaijan -- there are pipelines and trade that connect the countries, whether they like it or not -- but it will cool relations for a while."

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and other officials have tried to placate Baku by saying no final deal with be signed with Armenia until there is an agreement on Karabakh. Armenia and Azerbaijan have been engaged in slow moving negotiations over the territory’s fate as part of the Minsk Group process, which is overseen by the United States, Russia and France.

Hugh Pope, a Turkey analyst with the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, says linking the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border with the fate of the Karabakh issue is a mistake. "Ankara would be ill-advised to hold up rapprochement with Yerevan because of protests from its ally, Azerbaijan," Pope said. "In fact, normalizing relations with Armenia is the best way for Turkey to help its ethnic and linguistic Azerbaijani cousins. It would make Armenia feel more secure, making it perhaps also more open to a compromise over Nagorno-Karabakh."

"The way the Azeris are dealing with it now is that they are telling their people that they didn’t lose the war and they are talking about military reconquest and that’s completely unrealistic," Pope continued. "Turkey obviously has a lot of work to do to convince the Azeris that their current concept is not working and that your only way to get their land back is through the Minsk Group process."

Turkish and Armenian leaders, meanwhile, are also facing rising domestic anger about the possibility of a deal. In Armenia, the hard-line nationalist Armenian Revolutionary Federation Party on April 27 quit the country’s governing coalition. In Turkey, the opposition Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Republican People’s Party (CHP) have criticized the government for its overtures to Armenia, claiming it has sold out Azerbaijan.

"This demonstrates the fragility of the agreement, in that neither Turkey, nor Armenia nor Azerbaijan has done anything to prepare their societies or shape public opinion to prepare for an agreement," said Richard Giragosian, director of the Armenian Center for National and International Studies, a Yerevan-based think tank.

"The same can be said for Nagorno-Karabakh, where neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan has done anything to prepare society for an agreement," Giragosian added. "I would also stress that right now we are only talking about normalization. Normalization infers open borders and even historical commissions. But the second step is reconciliation and for that to happen we need civil society and public opinion involved, especially for reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia, because that means dealing with the genocide issue."

"If the public isn’t on board, we can’t sustain normalization or transform it into a deeper reconciliation," Giragosian emphasized.

Curtains Rising or Falling on Nabucco?

Named after a popular Verdi opera that tells the story of the Jews’ liberation from exile in Babylon, the troubled Nabucco pipeline project – designed to wean Europe off its dependence on Russian gas – has enough drama surrounding it that it could very well inspire an opera production of its own. There would be villainous Russians, cantankerous Turks, bumbling Brussels bureaucrats and a chorus of shivering Bulgarians begging to be delivered from clutches of Gazprom.

The 12$ billion, 2,050-mile long (3,300 kilometer) pipeline is designed to bring gas from the Caspian region and the Middle East to European markets via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. Construction is scheduled to start in 2010 and the pipeline is expected to start delivering gas three years later. That’s the plan, at least.

But most experts warn that Nabucco faces major hurdles, the biggest one being just how to fill the pipeline with gas. So far, only Azerbaijan has signed on to providing gas for Nabucco, but it can only fill a fraction of its capacity. Turkmenistan is an option, but there are logistical problems with getting its gas to the pipeline. The best answer for filling Nabucco, in many ways, is Iran, which has huge gas reserves. But both the United States and the European Union are currently opposed to making the Iranians part of Nabucco for political reasons.

Meanwhile, while Turkey’s role as a transit route for the pipeline is crucial, Nabucco is under threat of being held hostage to the politics surrounding Ankara’s beleaguered EU membership bid. During a recent visit to Brussels, Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that if the opening of the accession talks’ energy chapter is blocked, Turkey “would of course review our position [on Nabucco].” (Although Erdogan quickly backtracked, Germany’s Economy Minister Michael Glos accused Ankara of engaging in “political blackmail.”)

Nabucco is even under threat of being undercut by Moscow, which is suggesting Europe diversify is gas shipment routes (though not its supply) by the construction of South Stream, a pipeline that would bring Russian gas under the Black Sea to Bulgaria.

“What we have is a series of agreements and a theory,” says Bulent Aliriza, director of the Turkey Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, about Nabucco. “It’s got problems all the way down the line.”

The good news for Nabucco’s backers is that the recent gas dispute between Russia and the Ukraine, which left large parts of Europe shivering in the cold, might breath some new life into the pipeline project. The Hungarian government is today hosting a high-level summit for the various governments involved in Nabucco and there are hopes that the Russia-Ukraine row might push all the actors to get more serious about making the pipeline a reality.

Of course, even if Nabucco were built, it would still need to be seen as only part of a wider energy security and diversification program for the EU. To put things in perspective, while Europe’s annual gas demand is around 500 billion cubic meters (and growing), Nabucco is designed to carry only about 31 bcm annually. So, although it’s an alternative, it’s far from the answer to the EU’s energy woes.

“Simply building a pipeline slightly south is not a strategic issue; it’s a regional one,” says Andrew Monaghan, a research advisor at the NATO Defence College in Rome who recently wrote a paper examining Nabucco for the European Parliament. “What I’m saying is that we should consider enhancing the process, not simply changing the line and hoping that will create a better picture.”

For more on Nabucco’s prospects, take a look at my recent article in the Christian Science Monitor. An article on the Eurasianet website, tackles the thorny issue of Iran’s possible involvement in the project.

UPDATE -- As Reuters reports from the summit in Budapest, the EU is offering support for Nabucco in the way of possible loans, but is not ready to give direct financial support for the project.

Cracks in the Ilisu Dam Project?

The Ilisu dam project in southeast Turkey has been one of the country's most controversial energy and infrastructure plans for years. The proposed dam, which would be Turkey's 2nd largest, would lead to the displacement of tens of thousands -- mostly Kurdish villagers -- and the flooding of Hasankeyf, a unique, historic town on the Tigris River. The Turkish government claims the dam is an important part of a larger plan to bring economic development to the struggling region, but locals believe the damage caused by the project will outweigh any of its benefits. 

The project might now be in danger. According to an article in today's English-language Hurriyet, some of the Ilisu dam's main financial backers -- Austria, Germany and Switzerland -- are considering pulling out of the project because Turkey has failed to meet certain criteria regarding the dam's impact on the environment and human rights. Turkey could still move ahead with building the dam without the three countries' loans, but their backing out would still be a major blow and an important victory for the dam's opponents.

I visited the area around Hasankeyf last summer and filed this report for Eurasianet, looking at the Ilisu project and the larger economic development plan for the region.

UPDATE -- The German government has now officially withdrawn its support for the Ilisu dam.

(Two children in Hasankeyf fishing in the Tigris River. The town, which contains ruins dating back to Assyrian and Roman times, would end up mostly underwater if the Ilisu dam project is realized. By Yigal Schleifer)

The Paradox of Turkish-Israeli Relations

Today offers a good lesson in how paradoxical Turkish-Israeli relations can be. On the one hand, in a front-page article headlined "Scandal in the Rector's Office," the Turkish daily Hurriyet reports about an incident in which the rector of Istanbul University kicked out of his office both the Israeli ambassador to Turkey and consul general in Istanbul because he was offended by the presence of their armed bodyguards. It's the kind of event that certainly adds to the sense among some that a certain frost has settled over the once warm relations between Turkey and Israel (perhaps because of the election of the liberal Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002).

On the other hand, if we dig a little further in Hurriyet, we also find this article, which tells us about Turkey's plans to bring together its energy minister together with his Israeli and Indian counterparts to talk about joint projects in the energy field. In particular, the meeting would discuss the creation of a underwater pipeline that would link the Turkish port of Ceyhan with the Israeli port of Ashkelon. The new pipeline would carry oil from the Caspian region brought to Turkey via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. From Ashkelon, yet another pipeline would take the oil to Eilat, where it would be loaded onto tankers and shipped to India. (Confused? If so, you can read more about the project in an article I wrote for the Jewish Telegraphic Agency.) The pipeline, if built, would be a very concrete link joining Turkey and Israel on a number of levels.

What we have here is the continuation of a dynamic that's been going on for at least the last decade. On the popular level, Israel's image in Turkey keeps dropping. Recent public opinion surveys, for example, found that Israel is one of the countries least liked by Turks. On the political and economic level, though, the ties between the two countries keep deepening, with trade relations continuing to grow and the two countries looking for other ways to cooperate, beyond the Ceyhan-Ashkelon pipeline. In many ways, the relationship has normalized, moving away from one based almost exclusively on military ties to one that's more multi-dimensional (and perhaps more stable). But the split between the popular and official view of Israel is one that -- save for a peace agreement with the Palestinians and Israel's integration into the wider Middle East -- is likely to continue.